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Basic Appellate Practice:
A Guide to Perfecting an Appeal in Wyoming
BarbaraL. Lauer*
Adhering to the technical requirementsof the Wyoming Rules
of Appellate Procedurehas become increasingly important.In this
article, the author discusses the most common problems encountered in perfecting an appeal in Wyoming. This article is a
practicalguide to appellatepracticeand should be of value to experiencedattorneys as well as to the newest members of the Wyoming Bar.
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In 1984, 322 cases were filed in the Wyoming Supreme Court, nearly
four times the eighty-nine cases filed in 1969.' In the same period, the
number of justices on the court has increased only from four to five, the
2
maximum number currently allowed by the Wyoming Constitution.
Wyoming has no intermediate appellate court, nor has it adopted the practice of assigning cases for hearing by a panel of the court.' Our constitution and statutes require that the court act with at least a majority,4 and
the internal operating rules of the supreme court require that the "full
court shall sit in consideration of all cases.' In addition, the court must
decide all cases by written opinion.6 Because of these constitutional,
statutory, and rule restrictions, the increase in the number of cases filed
reflects a real increase in the workload of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Against this backdrop, the provisions of rule 1.02 of the Wyoming
Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.), governing failure to comply with
the appellate rules, take on alarming significance.7 Rule 1.02 provides that
the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and therefore the
court must dismiss an appeal which is not timely filed. For other rules
violations, rule 1.02 authorizes "such action as the reviewing court deems
appropriate." Such action includes, but is not limited to, some fairly
serious consequences: citing a party or his attorney for contempt; refusing to consider the offender's contentions; assessing costs; and affirming
or dismissing the appeal. While rule 1.02 merely authorizes dismissal for
violation of the bulk of the rules, other appellate rules, such as rule 1.04,
governing final orders, make compliance jurisdictional. In addition the
Wyoming Supreme Court decisions have made dismissal mandatory for
several other rules violations.9 Furthermore, the sanctions imposed for
1. This is also nearly twice the 162 cases filed ten years ago in 1974. See Appendix 1.
2. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4(a).
3. The court did try the practice of panelling once, but abandoned the experiment as
unsuccessful.
4. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4(a); WYO. STAT. § 5-2-106 (1977).
5. WYo. SuP. CT. INT. OPEa. PROC. 2(a)(i).
6. WYO. STAT. § 5-2-110 (1977); Wyo. R. APP. P. 7.01. Although the practice is laudable,
it adds much to the court's workload. See Note, Written Opinionsin the Modem Legal System:
Publish and Perish, 41 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1977) for an analysis of the pros and cons of
publishing opinions.
7.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. The failure to comply with any other of these rules or any order of court does not affect the validity
of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the reviewing court deems
appropriate, including but not limited to citation of counsel or a party for contempt, refusal to consider the offending party's contentions, assessment of
costs, or dismissal or affirmance.
Wyo. R. APP. P. 1.02.
8. Wyo. R. APP. P. 1.04; Molle v. Iberlin Ranch, 614 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Wyo. 1980).
See infra text accompanying notes 42-104.
9. One such example is untimely filing of the record on appeal. See infra notes 167,
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those violations which will not result in dismissal often may be difficult
to distinguish from dismissal."
While dismissal is neither automatic" nor the only sanction for failure
to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, it is clearly authorized.
"This court has consistently held that compliance with rules promulgated
by this court is required and we have regularly invoked the sanction of
dismissal for failure of the appellant to comply therewith."' 2 While the
supreme court has disclaimed any scheme to "concoct a rule violation,'I13
it has criticized failure to follow the rules14 and has taken an increasingly
harsh stand against rules violations over the years.15 It is clear that as
the number of cases increase so do the dismissals.' 6 Because an appeal
is a privilege only," perhaps in the future the sanction deemed appropriate
for a rule violation will more likely be dismissal. The supreme court indeed has said that the orderly administration of justice depends on procedural rules, which cannot be relaxed at the whim of the court.' 8
The spectre of dismissal is not a welcome one to the attorneys of this
state. And yet, because the bulk of the dismissal orders are not published
(either in the reporter system, or even in the advance sheet service), the
bar in general has no convenient method of tracking what the court is
doing. In many cases the only individuals to learn from what the court
has done are the parties to the appeal. Whatever lesson is to be gleaned
172 and cases cited therein. In 1984, one appeal was dismissed for failure to file timely the
record on appeal.
Another example is failure to file appellant's brief. See infra note 220 and cases cited
therein. Untimely filing of appellant's brief should also be noted. See infra note 219 and cases
cited therein; Wyo. R. App. P. 5.11. In 1984, 13 appeals were dismissed for failure to file
timely appellant's brief.
One final example is improper number of appellant's brief. See infra notes 208-210 and
cases cited therein. In 1984 no appeal was dismissed for filing the improper number of briefs,
but in International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 279 v. Civil Service Comm'n, No. 84-244
(Wyo. appeal pending March 11, 1985), the City of Cheyenne neglected to file timely appellee's
brief, and asked the supreme court to consider the trial brief instead. The court declined
to do so. Letter from Chief Justice Rooney, International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 279
v. Civil Service Comm'n, No. 84-244 (Nov. 20, 1984).
10. For example, when an appellant fails to support properly his arguments, dismissal
is not the usual sanction. The court merely refuses to consider the specific issue unsupported
by authority or cogent argument. See infra notes 201, 202 and cases cited therein. Of course,
if none of the issues raised were appropriately supported, the court would consider no issue.
It is difficult to see how this differs from a dismissal.
11. The court disavowed any automatic dismissal theory in DS v. Department of Public
Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 914 (Wyo. 1980).
12. Dixon v. City of Worland, 595 P.2d 84, 86 (Wyo. 1979).
13. "We do not function for the purpose of demonstrating our authority and awesome
power to wave a wand and make an appeal disappear, but exist to administer justice to those
who come to settle their disputes." Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1114 (Wyo. 1982).
14. The court has said it "would be gratified if attorneys in this state would follow
our rules .... "In re Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 649 (Wyo. 1983); Graham v. Walker,
No. 84-309 (Wyo. motion to dismiss denied Jan. 18, 1985). See also infra text accompanying
notes 128-130.
15. Compare the old and new approach concerning failure to make cogent argument,
infra text accompanying notes 200-202.
16. See Appendix II.
17. Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 875 (Wyo. 1975).
18. Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977).
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from the dismissal orders can do the parties to the appeal little good-it
comes too late, in most cases, to help them. They learn only for their next
appeal.
Yet many of the appeals dismissed in 1984 were dismissed on the basis
of sound, published precedent. Thus what the court said in 1944 still rings
true: "It is rather unfortunate that counsel are so busy that they do not
have time to consult the decisions of this court, and that we should continually be presented with a simple question of practice which has been
before this court a number of times."'' Because the supreme court's
caseload is increasing at a phenomenal rate, and because changes in the
structure of the court, which might help it better deal with its caseload
cannot be made without amending the rules, the statutes, or the constitution,20 one can predict an increasing use of dismissal as a sanction for
failure to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. It has long been
clear that the court will reach jurisdictional defects on its own motion,
if necessary. The court is "duty bound to inquire into the matter and
' '2
dismiss the appeal if the record discloses a want of such jurisdiction. '
The purpose of this article is to point out the most common reasons
appeals are dismissed in the supreme court.2 Not all aspects of appellate
practice will be discussed here. 23 While the rules of appellate procedure
cover appeals to the district court from inferior courts or administrative
agencies, 4 the focus here is on practice in the supreme court alone. In addition, because petitions for certiorari are not yet covered in the appellate
rules, they will not be addressed here.2 1 While this article is directed
19. York v. James, 60 Wyo. 222, 233-34, 148 P.2d 596, 600 (1944).
20. The Wyoming Legislature has appropriated funds to add two additional attorneys
to the supreme court staff on July 1, 1985, to help alleviate the congestion. In addition, it
is clearly appropriate and necessary for the court to consider amending the rules to include
provisions requiring docketing statements (and a corresponding limited argument calendar),
limiting further the length of briefs and record appendices, and expediting the processing
of appeals. Since the requirement that all decisions be announced by written opinion is
statutory, the legislature may also be required to act to assist the court in dealing appropriately with its increased caseload.
21. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327,
328 (Wyo. 1968), citing Big Horn Coal Co. v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 313,
224 P.2d 172, 177 (1950). "Even though these jurisdictional deficiencies were not called to
our attention by the parties, it was, nevertheless, our unhappy obligation to call them up
ourselves." Rutledge v. Vonfeldt, 564 P.2d 350, 352 (Wyo. 1977). See also Compton v. State,
555 P.2d 232, 233 (Wyo. 1976).
22. The causes of the 1984 dismissals are summarized in Appendix II.
23. For a complete guide to appellate practice in Wyoming, the reader is directed to
R. RIDEOUT & S. HACKL, WYOMING APPELLATE PRACTICE UNDER THE WYOMING RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE (1985).

24. Wyo. R. APP. P. 1.01, 1.03; Wood v. City of Casper, 660 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo.
1983); Mayland v. State, 568 P.2d 897, 898-99 (Wyo. 1977). See Wvo. R. APP. P. 12 and Wyo.
R. APP. P. Cts. Limited Juris. 1.01.
25. But interested persons should consult Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 3; Kobos v. Sugden,
694 P.2d 110 (Wyo. 1985); State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1984); State v. Heiner,
683 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1984); City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340 (Wyo. 1983); Call v. Town
of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1957); City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157
P. 892 (1916). See also Note, The State'sRight to Appeal in CriminalCases. State v. Heiner,
683 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1984), 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 723 (1985). In 1984, the court denied
seven petitions for writs of certiorari and granted two in addition to the cases cited above.
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primarily at attorneys practicing in Wyoming, the cautions contained
herein apply equally to those persons who represent themselves. The
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that no special consideration will be
given a litigant appearing pro se. He has no greater rights than other
litigants and he will be treated as if he were represented by an attorney.',
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Although perfecting an appeal is a fairly simple process, numerous
roadblocks can arise." It is unusual for an individual case to encounter
more than one obstacle, but two cases filed in 1984 demonstrate that there
are many pitfalls along the way.
The case of Nicholas v. Chaput" is one such case. Nicholas was the
attorney and personal representative for the Kicken estate and attorney
for the operating receivership. He was relieved of his duties as personal
representative on May 23, 1983. After a March 15, 1984 hearing, the trial
court entered an order denying various motions and indicating that
Nicholas had no standing to participate further in the proceedings.
Nicholas appealed from that order on April 19, 1984. His appeal was
ultimately dismissed for failure to file timely a brief of appellant. 1 On June
21, 1984, the trial court approved the receivership report, but denied the
request to terminate the receivership. Nicholas appealed from that order
30
on June 29, 1984, but his appeal was dismissed for lack of a final order.
On September 18, 1984, the trial court entered an order denying
Nicholas' amended motion to intervene. Nicholas appealed from that order,
but failed to designate a transcript.3' On September 25, 1984, the final
order and decree granting the petition to dissolve the receivership was
entered. Nicholas also appealed from that order.2 Unfortunately, the
notice of appeal from the September 25, 1984 order specified an appeal
from all previous orders, judgments and decrees, including the order denying intervention. The court dismissed this second appeal on December 6,
1984, and noted that as to the order denying intervention, the second
notice of appeal was not timely, that the other orders were not specified,
that there was no designation of transcript or notation of the court to
which the appeal was taken, and that Nicholas had no standing to appeal
from the order dissolving the receivership.3 3 That same order allowed the
26. In re Parental Rights of GP, JP, and SP, 679 P.2d 976, 984 (Wyo. 1984); Osborn
v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1984); Annis v. Beebe and Runyan Furniture Company, 685 P.2d 678, 680 (Wyo. 1984). See also Urich v. Fox, 687 P.2d 893, 894 (Wyo. 1984):
"While we do not grant pro se litigants special status, neither do we punish them for acting
without an attorney."
27. A checklist to help smooth the road to perfecting an appeal appears at Appendix VI.
28. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-112 (Wyo. dismissed July 13, 1984); Nicholas v. Chaput,
No. 84-168 (Wyo. dismissed Aug. 13, 1984); Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-267 (Wyo. dismissed
Dec. 6, 1984); Nicholas v. Cbaput, No. 84-268 (Wyo. dismissed Dec. 19, 1984).
29. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-112 (Wyo. dismissed July 13, 1984).
30. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-168 (Wyo. dismissed Aug. 13, 1984).
31. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-268 (Wyo. motion to dismiss denied Dec. 6, 1984).
32. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-267 (Wyo. dismissed Dec. 6, 1984).
33. Id.
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appeal from the September 18 order denying intervention. However, on
December 19, 1984, the supreme court dismissed
this appeal also, because
4
the appellant's brief was not timely filed.1
The second illustrative case is Hanson v. State, 35 a criminal case. Hanson was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault on July 9, 1982.
On August 27, 1982, his retained counsel filed a notice of appeal which
stated that the appeal was from the "verdict of guilt renewed against him
on July 9, 1982; from Judge Troughton's denial of the motion of acquittal and motion for new trial on August 19, 1982." On November 4, 1982,
the supreme court dismissed the appeal because the notice of appeal failed
to state that the appeal was from the judgment and sentence, a final order
as defined by rule 1.05 of the W.R.A.P. On November 5, 1982, Hanson's
appointed counsel filed a petition to reinstate the appeal. This petition
was denied on November 23, 1982.
On March 2, 1984, Hanson filed a petition for post-conviction relief
in the district court alleging that ineffective assistance of counsel had
deprived him of his right to appeal. On August 14, 1984, the trial judge
entered an order nunc pro tunc in the belief that Hanson would be allowed
to appeal from that order. A timely notice of appeal was filed and Hanson's brief was also timely filed after two timely extensions. On October
31, however, Hanson's appeal was dismissed. The supreme court explained
that the order nunc pro tunc related back to the original judgment and
sentence and thus the appeal was not timely filed.36 On November 13, 1984,
Hanson filed a petition to reinstate the appeal, and in the alternative requested a writ of certiorari. The court denied the petition on December
4, 1984. Apparently the supreme court based its decision on the fact that
the trial court had reserved the right to act further and this prevented
37
the order nunc pro tunc entered on August 14 from being a final order.
The court also noted that Hanson could appeal from the trial court's final
disposition.
34. Nicholas v. Chaput, No. 84-268 (Wyo. dismissed Dec. 19, 1984).
35. Hanson v. State, No. 84-239 (Wyo. dismissed Oct. 31, 1984, reinstatement denied,
cert. denied Dec. 4, 1984).
36. Id.
37. I say "apparently" because the order seems to indicate this. The court said the
proceeding for post-conviction relief was still before the district court because the nunc pro
tunc order did not relate to substantive error in original judgment, but was intended only
to reinstate the judgment in order to circumvent the appellate rules. The court quoted the
trial judge:
the District Court having stated during the hearing on the petition for postconviction relief that it "had serious questions in its own mind about the inadequacy of the counsel" and "we are going to enter the order for nunc pro
tunc and I'm going to reserve, then, on whether to grant Mr. Hanson a new
trial" and "if you [the Supreme Court] decide not to give this man an appeal,
then you're going to put fairly squarely back on me whether I should give him
a new trial" and "I'm going to do everything I can to get you an appeal * * *
including informing the Supreme Court, as I have done, that if they don't give
you an appeal, I may give you a new trial, even though I don't think there
is grounds for it."
The supreme court pointed out that it is "the function of this Court to review alleged
errors of the district courts and not the function of the district court to review actions or
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Both of these cases demonstrate that even though it is possible and
even probable for a litigant to perfect an appeal to the supreme court on
his first attempt, some people do not manage it for one reason or another.
When that happens, the road to perfecting an appeal can become rocky
indeed. There are a number of problems which may arise in an appeal.
The most common of these will be examined in greater detail in the following sections in the order in which they confront the practitioner: matters
preliminary to the appeal, the notice of appeal, the record on appeal, and
briefs.
MArrERS PRELIMINARY TO THE APPEAL

Conducting Litigation: Building the Record
The reord on appeal is built upon the trial court record. Rule 4.01 of
the W.R.A.P. requires that the papers and exhibits filed in the district
court be included in the record on appeal. Documents which may be pertinent on appeal should, therefore, be filed with the district court. Under
rule 4.01, all or part of any transcripts may be included in the record on
appeal. The transcript of a proceeding serves as verification that the
claimed objection was made, that the witness said what is claimed, or that
the trial court ruled as is alleged. When a transcript is not made, or not
included in the record on appeal, unless the parties proceed on a stipulated
record, there is no way for the supreme court to ascertain what happened
at a given hearing or proceeding. The facts necessary for a decision must
be before the supreme court. 8 The supreme court is not the place to
develop facts.3 9 Issues which may arise on an appeal should be brought
to the trial court's attention; the supreme court will not consider matters
raised for the first time
on appeal unless the matters go to jurisdiction
40
or are fundamental.
It is the appellant's responsibility to build a proper record on appeal,"
but because it cannot be known at the outset of a trial which party will
be the appellant, counsel for all parties share the responsibility of developing an adequate record. Therefore, trial counsel should keep in mind the
appellate requirements concerning the record, as well as concerning preservation of error, during all stages of litigation.
Final OrderRequired
The next step to confront the attorney who has conducted litigation
with an eye toward building the record on appeal is deciding when and
alleged errors of this Court." What seemed to be dispositive, however, was "the reservation
of potential action by the District Court in the event this Court decides not to give this man
an appeal makes that order here attempted to be appealed from not a final order."/d.
38. Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 518, 520 (Wyo. 1983).
39. Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 551 (Wyo. 19801.
40. Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 907-08 (Wyo. 1980).
41. In re Estate of Manning, 646 P.2d 175, 176 (Wyo. 1982); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599
P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 1979).
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from what to appeal. The simple answer, that an appeal should be taken
only from a final order, belies the often complex nature of this decision.
Failure to appeal from a final order always results in dismissal because
42
the supreme court only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders.
In a sense, dismissal of an appeal for lack of a final order is not as serious
as other dismissals, because the possibility always exists that the order
might later become final, or that a different order might be entered.13 On
the other hand, where the appeal is dismissed for failure to meet a time
requirement, there is precious little that can be done to correct the situation.
Because there are a great many reported opinions concerning final
orders, attorneys have more guidance on the operation of this rule than
on many others. Yet lack of a final order is one of the most common reasons
for dismissing an appeal, not only on the supreme court's own motion but
on appellee's motion as well.4 Guidance in determining whether an order
is final can be taken from Public Service Commission v. Lower Valley
Power andLight, Inc.: "Generally a judgment or order which determines
the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration
is final and appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does these
things." 45 Despite this definition, it is not always clear whether the order
in question was a final order. The cases in which the court has been split
is a final order indicate the difficulty
on whether the order in question
46
of making the determination.
Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.)
was taken from and is almost identical to former rule 72(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.). Rule 72(c) of the W.R.C.P. provided that "A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court
may be [reviewed]." 47 The same language appears in current rule 1.04 of
the W.R.A.P. Under former rule 72(a) of the W.R.C.P. and current rule
1.05 of the W.R.A.P., there are three kinds of appealable orders: orders
A final order is: (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action, when
such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an order
affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary
application in an action, after judgment; (3) an order, including a conditional
order, granting a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59 (a)(4) and (5),
W.R.C.P.; if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain
final and in effect for the purposes of appeal by another party.
Wyo. R. App. P. 1.05.
43. Crossan v. Irrigation Dev. Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo. 1979). See In re Estate
of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 648 (Wyo. 1983) (the first appeal was dismissed for lack of a final
order, but that order became final when the final decree of distribution was entered, so the
second appeal was allowed).
44. In 1984, the supreme court dismissed twenty-five appeals for lack of a final order.
Twenty-three of these dismissals were on its own motion, two on appellee's motion as well
as the court's motion, and one on appellee's motion alone.
45. 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980).
46. Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982) (four opinions filed); Public Service Comm'n
v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1980); Arp v. State Highway
Comm'n, 567 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1977); Olmstead v. Cattle, Inc., 541 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1975).
47. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (repealed).
42.
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which prevent judgment, orders in special proceedings, and orders granting new trials because the amount of judgment is improper- additur or
remittitur.
Orders Which Prevent Judgment
The first kind of appealable order is "an order affecting a substantial
right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment."4 It has been said that this statement is sufficiently
plain that it needs no further interpretation.4 9 This may be an oversimplification.
A ruling that the district court has no jurisdiction to proceed is an
order affecting a substantial right and determining the action or preventing a judgment."0 However, the denial of a motion which, if granted, would
terminate the action, is not an appealable order.5 ' For example, an order
denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order.5 2
An order denying a motion to dismiss is not a final order.5 3 Nor is an order
denying a free transcript, entered before the petition for post-conviction
relief is filed.5 4 In 1984, the court
decided that the denial of a writ of pro5
hibition is not a final order.
In order to be final, an order must finish something. For example, an
order dismissing with prejudice is a final order.5 6 But an order purporting to deny a motion to intervene where a hearing is set upon the motion7
does not terminate the possibility of intervention and is not a final order.
The following orders do not finish anything and thus are not final and
appealable: an order of taking in eminent domain proceedings;58 an order
referring a matter to arbitration 8 or consolidating arbitration proceedings; an interlocutory order denying discovery; 6 ' an order striking a de48. Wyo. R. App. P. 1.05(1).
49. Note, The Right of Appeal in Wyoming, 18 Wyo. L.J. 61, 62 (1963).
50. Id,
51. Id
52. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 888 (Wyo. 1983), citing Collins v.
Memorial Hosp. of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 1974). In 1984, one attempted
appeal from an order denying summary judgment was dismissed.
53. Stamper v. State, 672 P.2d 106, 106 (Wyo. 1983). One such appeal was dismissed
in 1984.
54. Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979). In 1984, two appeals were
dismissed on this ground.
55. Wilson v. Christopulos, No. 84-157 (Wyo. dismissed Aug. 9, 1984).
56. CLS v. CLJ, JME, CJE, 693 P.2d 774, 777 (Wyo. 1985).
57. In re Land Use Change Application of the Pat O'Hara Company, No. 84-58 (Wyo.
dismissed Apr. 3, 1984).
58. Arp v. State Highway Comm'n, 567 P.2d 736, 739 (Wyo. 1977).
59. American Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing, 562 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Wyo.
1977); Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-119 (1977).
60. Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, No. 83-155 (Wyo. dismissed Sept.
22, 1983); Wyo. Stat. § 1-36-119 (1977).
61. Cubin v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680, 682 (Wyo. 1984).
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mand for a jury trial;6 2 and an order not designed to dispose of the matter
at hand, but only designed to obtain additional information.6"
Ordinarily an order setting aside a default judgment and resuming
a cause is not a final order, but where the default judgment is set aside
for lack of jurisdiction,the order is final.64 Generally in a criminal case,
it is the judgment and sentence which is the final order, but where the
record contains
no finding of guilt, the judgment and sentence is not con65
sidered final.
Because an order does not "determine the action" until it is entered,
an oral direction of a verdict by the trial court is not a final order.". A
6
memorandum opinion of a trial judge is not a final order.
Y Nor are find68
form.
order
in
not
law
of
conclusions
ings of fact and
Generally, any order disposing of a new trial motion is not final.6 9 This
is because if the motion is denied, the original order is final and
appealable. 6 The appellant must appeal from the order which became final
upon denial of the new trial.71 He cannot appeal from both the original
order and the order denying a new trial. 7 However, if the motion is
granted, there will be no appealable order until the new trial has been
held. 71 If a new trial is granted, the original order is no longer in force
and thus is not appealable.
62. Hamburg v. Jones, 510 P.2d 791, 791 (Wyo. 1973).
63. Public Service Comm'n v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661
(Wyo. 1980).
64. First Wyoming Bank-Casper v. Berrett, No. 84-278 (Wyo. dismissed as moot Dec.
19, 1984).
65. Caton v. State, No. 84-256 (Wyo. extension granted; trial judge entered finding of
guilt Nov. 7, 1984).
66. Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vanelli, 370 P.2d 738, 738 (Wyo. 1962).
67. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Niezwaag, 444 P.2d 327,
328 (Wyo. 1968).
68. Id at 329; School Dist. No. 3, Carbon County v. Western Tube Co., 13 Wyo. 304,
327-28, 80 P. 155, 159 (1905); Gramm v. Fisher, 3 Wyo. 595, 595, 29 P. 377, 378 (1892).
69. Sun Land & Cattle Company v. Brown, 387 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Wyo. 1964).
70. Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo. 1967). In Opie, the supreme court allowed an appeal from the denial for a motion for a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence,
filed more than a year after Opie's conviction had been affirmed. Opie v. State, 389 P.2d
684 (Wyo. 1964). The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the motion. The precedential weight of this decision is uncertain since the court said,
It should perhaps be noted that this court has elected to dispose of the instant
case on the merits rather than on the question of whether defendant is entitled to be heard at all. By doing so, we do not mean to imply a decision one
way or the other on the right of defendant to be heard in an instance where
there has been a delay in filing a motion for new trial.
Opie, 422 P.2d at 88.
71. Rutledge v. Vonfeldt, 564 P.2d 350, 351 (Wyo. 1977); Financial Management Corp.
v. Wyoming Electrical Sign Co., 561 P.2d 237, 237 (Wyo. 1977).
72. Sun Land & Cattle Company v. Brown, 387 P.2d 1004,1006 (Wyo. 1964). Apparently
the same is true of a denial of judgment of acquittal in light of Hanson v. State, No. 84-239
(Wyo. dismissed Oct. 31, 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
73. An exception arises under Wyo. R. App. P. 1.05, which provides that an order granting a new trial under rules 59(a)(4) and (5)of the W.R.C.P. is a final order. Rule 59(a) states
as grounds for a new trial: (4) "Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice" and (5) Error in the amount of assessment of the recovery,
whether too large or too small." Wyo. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4) and (5).
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Rule 1.05 of the W.R.A.P. must be examined in light of rule 54(b) of
the W.R.C.P.14 It is especially appropriate to do so here because the bulk
75
of the 1984 dismissals for lack of a final order were for rule 54(b) problems.
Orders which do not adjudicate all the claims or the liabilities of all the
parties and do not contain an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay, "shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
or parties," and thus do not meet the final order requirements of rule
1.05(1) of the W.R.A.P 7 6 The interplay of rule 1.05 of the W.R.A.P. and
rule 54(b) of the W.R.C.P. is amply demonstrated by a case in which the
supreme court said that an order denying a motion to vacate a default
judgment and dismiss the action, entered as sanction for failure to allow
discovery, may affect a substantial right, as required by rule 1.05 of the
W.R.A.P., but it does not have the effect of determining the action or
preventing a judgment. Thus, the order disposes of fewer than all of the
77
claims and is not a final order as required by rule 54(b) of the W.R.C.P.
The stated purpose of rule 54(b) of the W.R.C.P. is to avoid unnecessary piecemeal appeals. 8 Piecemeal appeals occur where a party appeals from part of a case. There are two types of rule 54(b) problems: multiple claims and multiple parties. When an order disposes of less than all
of the claims or parties, it may nonetheless be a final, appealable order,
if the order meets the requirements of rule 54(b). The Wyoming Supreme
Court, in Griffin v. Bethesda Foundation,explained the requirements of
rule 54(b):
Rule 54(b) calls into play a two-step decision-making process.
First, the district court must determine that Rule 54(b) applies,
i.e., are there multiple claims or multiple partiesas contemplated
by Rule 54(b)? The answer to this threshold question is by nature
74. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54(b), provides:
When more than one (1)claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one (1)or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
75. A total of twenty-five appeals were dismissed for lack of a final order in 1984, twelve
of these for rule 54(b) problems. See Appendix II.
76. "As is evident from the annotation which follows Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P. in the Wyoming Court Rules volume, this court has frequently addressed questions concerning the limitations of Rule 54(b)." Griffin v. Bethesda Foundation, 609 P.2d 459, 460 (Wyo. 1980).
77. Tschirgi v. Meyer, 536 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1975).
78. Molle v. Iberlin Ranch, 614 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Wyo. 1980); Olmstead v. Cattle, Inc.,
541 P.2d 49, 51 (Wyo. 1975); Lutheran Hosps. and Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, 469
P.2d 409, 410 (Wyo. 1970); Reeves v. Harris, 380 P.2d 769, 769 (Wyo. 1963). This has not
always been the purpose of appellate rules. Logan v. Stannard, 439 P.2d 24, 25 (Wyo. 1968).
Actually, the purpose of rule 54(b) can be said to permit piecemeal appeals whenever the
trial judge certifies finality.
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one of law and this court gives no special deference to the determination made by the district court.
Once this question has been answered affirmatively, the
district court must move on to the second determination, i.e., is
there no just reason for delay? This determination is reviewable
only for an abuse of discretion. This is so because such a decision
is more in the nature of a factual determination. 9
Although the court in Griffin indicated the trial judge's determination
that there is no just reason for delay is reviewable only for an abuse of
discretion, the court has also hinted that the trial judge must be correct.8"
It is clear that where there are multiple parties there are frequently
multiple claims. But multiple claims can also exist where there are but
two parties. For example, in Hoback Ranches, Inc. v. Urroz,8 ' the cross
claim of the appellant against the appellee had not been determined in
the order granting partial summary judgment. Therefore, not all of the
claims had been determined. Because there was no express determination
by the trial court that there was no just cause for delay, the appeal was
dismissed for lack of a final order.82 Without an express determination
by the trial court, a partial summary judgment is not a final, appealable
where liability, but not damages, is determined, there
order.83 For example,
84
is no final order.
Rule 54(b) claims were also at issue in Griffin v. Bethesda Foundation."
In Griffin, the trial court granted partial summary judgment as to two
of the four counts of plaintiff's complaint and made the 54(b) certification that there was no just cause for delay. On its own motion, the supreme
court recognized a rule 54(b) problem and asked the parties to submit briefs
concerning multiple claims.86 The supreme court determined that all four
of plaintiff's claims rested on the underlying contract, even though two
sounded in tort and two in contract. Because the four counts arose from
one contract, there was really only one claim, and the district court erred
in determining there were multiple claims. Because there was only one
claim, rule 54(b) did not apply. Therefore, the certification by the trial judge
that there was no just reason for delay was meaningless. The court found
there was no final order, even with the express determination, and dismissed the appeal. 7
79. 609 P.2d 459, 461 (Wyo. 1980) (citations omitted).
80. See Molle v. Iberlin Ranch, 614 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Wyo. 1980) (appeal dismissed for
lack of a final order despite trial judge's certification). Of course, the determination that
there are multiple claims or multiple parties is reviewable.
81. 622 P.2d 948 (Wyo. 1981).
82. Id at 949.
83. Hayes v. Nielson, 568 P.2d 905,906 (Wyo. 1977); Crossan v. Irrigation Dev. Corp.,
598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo. 1979).
84. Dexter v. O'Neal, 649 P.2d 680, 681 (Wyo. 1982); Mott v. England, 604 P.2d 560,
563 (Wyo. 1979). Two appeals from partial summary judgment were dismissed in 1984.
85. 609 P.2d 459, 461 (Wyo. 1985).
86. Id. at 459-60.
87. Id at 461.
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The other type of rule 54(b) problem involves multiple parties-where
an order disposes of some, but not all, of the parties. Olmstead v. Cattle,
Inc. 8 was one such case. There the plaintiff sued nine defendants. The
district court dismissed as to three defendants because it had no personal
jurisdiction over them. Thus, six defendants were left in the case.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff appealed from the order dismissing three of the
defendants."9 In dismissing the appeal, the supreme court explained that
because there was no express determination by the trial court that there
was no just reason for delay, the order was not final."
In Wetering v. Eisele, the court determined that although the granting of a motion to strike is not a final order, where the motion to strike
the victim's brother and sister as persons on whose behalf a wrongful death
suit could be brought was granted, the order adversely affected the siblings' rights. Therefore it was proper for the trial court to make the rule
54(b) determinations and there was no abuse of discretion in the certification that there was no just reason for delay.9'
It is clear that it is an oversimplification to state that the first type
of final order in rule 1.05 is so obvious that it needs no clarification. Rather,
it contains a number of traps for the unwary. Counsel can avoid many
of the pitfalls under rule 54(b) of the W.R.C.P. and rule 1.05 of the
W.R.A.P. by simply counting up the parties or the claims, as the case
may be. A diagram of the suit is often helpful. 2 Where an order does not
determine all the claims of all the parties, counsel can draft an order that
expressly determines there is no just cause for delay.2 Or he can delay
an appeal until the order becomes final when all the claims and the rights
of all the parties have been determined.9 4 As noted above, final order
dismissals are not as serious as time dismissals, because an order which
is not now final will in all likelihood become final. 9A
new notice of appeal
5
may then be filed when the order becomes final.
Orders in Special Proceedings
The second category of appealable order under rule 1.05 is "an order
affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon summary application in an action, after judgment." This category of final order
was defined, none too clearly, in Anderson v. Englehart:
88. 541 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1975).
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id at 51.
91. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Wyo. 1984).
92. See, e.g., Big Chief Exploration Co. v. Oil Country Supply, No. 84-254 (Wyo. dismissed Oct. 31, 1984).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
94. See Bacon v. Carey Co., 669 P.2d 533, 536 (Wyo. 1983) (second order, dismissing
original parties which were not parties to the appeal, corrected any rule 54(b) defect in the
original judgment). See also Noonan v. Texaco, No. 84-243 (Wyo. dismissed Oct. 31,1984)
discussed infra text accompanying notes 178-81.
95. But this is not without difficulties of its own. See infra text accompanying notes
181-184.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 20 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XX

[W]e think that a proceeding may be special, within the meaning
of the statute governing appeals, although connected with a pending action, and there appears to us to be no good reason for denying to a provisional remedy, which may be disposed of by an order
independent of the ultimate determination of the cause, the
character of "special proceeding" 6 with respect to what constitutes
a final order under the statute.
More recently the court has said:
Generally, special proceedings are those which were not actions
in law or suits in equity under the common law, and which may
be commenced by motion or petition upon notice for the purpose
of obtaining relief of a special or distinct type. They result from
a right conferred by law together with authorization of a special
9
application to the courts to enforce it.
1
Examples of orders made in special proceedings are orders in contempt
proceedings, orders granting or denying a temporary injunction, orders
dissolving or sustaining an attachment, and orders appointing or discharging a receiver. However, orders granting or denying temporary alimony
or support in a divorce case and orders appointing assessors to value land
in a condemnation suit do not fall in this category. 9 The court has treated
a proceeding to modify a divorce decree as a special proceeding." Juvenile
court proceedings are also special proceedings. 100 Beyond the rule, the
definitions, and the examples, there is little to guide the determination
of what is an order made in a special proceeding. What one commentator
has said about special proceedings in Wyoming remains valid today: "It
would seem.., that the only definitive rule that can be stated as to this
aspect of a final order is that a special proceeding exists only if the
Supreme Court wishes to hear that type of case."' 01
Orders GrantingRemittitur or Additur
The third category of appealable orders concerns the trial court's
granting of remittitur or additur, and is little seen in Wyoming. 10 2 It should
be noted, however, that this is an exception to the general rule that an
order disposing of a motion for a new trial is not a final appealable order. 10 3
96. 18 Wyo. 196, 208, 105 P. 571, 575 (1909).
97. State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo. 1981) (citations omitted).
98. Note, supra note 49, at 62-63.
99. McMillan v. McMillan, No. 84-285.
100. State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo. 1981).
101. Note, supra note 49, at 63.
102. See Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912 (Wyo. 1983); Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d
1246 JWyo. 1977); Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 562 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 1977); Smith
v. Blair, 521 P.2d 581 (Wyo. 1974); Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784
(Wyo. 1973); Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1973); McPike v. Scheuerman, 398 P.2d
71 (Wyo. 1965); DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1963); Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33
Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255 (1925); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27 (1871).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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At an earlier date, it was urged that the final decision rule, now contained in rule 1.05 of the W.R.A.P., be amended and simplified. 0 4 Unfortunately, the rule has been little amended, but there are a number of
reported cases which should guide practicing attorneys in this state in
determining the scope of the final order rule. Only the most common problems have been discussed here.
Whether to Appeal
After building an adequate record and obtaining a final order, counsel's
next task is to consult with his client and decide whether an appeal should
be taken. In a criminal matter the decision is easier because there is often
little to lose. The decision to appeal is more complicated in a civil case
owing to the existence of rule 10.05 of the W.R.A.P.' 0' Rule 10.05 provides that an appellant who does not prevail on appeal will be taxed for
the cost of appellee's preparation of his brief.'10 In addition, unless the
court finds reasonable cause for the appeal, it may assess a fee for the
appellee's attorney of up to $500 and a penalty of up to $1,000."?1
The purpose of rule 10.05 is not to discourage appeals,' 0 and penalties
have not been frequently imposed. 1 9 The court has said the rule is not
appropriately invoked where a discretionary ruling is challenged." 0 Beyond
that, however, it is unclear just when there is no "reasonable cause" for
an appeal.
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL

Contents

Once the decision to appeal has been made, the next step is to compose the notice of appeal."' The requirements of rule 2.02 of the W.R.A.P.
104. Note, supra note 48, at 64.

105. Wyo. R. App. P. 10.05 provides:
When, in a civil case, the judgment or final order is affirmed, appellee shall

recover the cost for typewriting and reproducing his brief, such cost to be computed at the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.
Unless the court certifies that there was reasonable cause for the appeal, there
shall also be taxed as part of the costs in the case, a reasonable fee, to be fixed
by the court, not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five
hundred dollars ($500.00), to the counsel of the appellee, and to the appellee
damages in such sum as may be reasonable, not exceeding one thousand dollars
($1,000.00), unless the judgment or final order directs the payment of money,
and execution thereof was stayed, when in lieu of such penalty, it shall bear
additional interest at a rate not exceeding five percent (5%) per annum, for
the time for which it was stayed, to be ascertained and awarded by the court.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 638 P.2d 147, 155-56 (Wyo. 1981) (Rooney,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. But see Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730, 732 (Wyo. 1985); Reno Livestock Corp.
v. Sun Oil Co., 638 P.2d 147, 155 (Wyo. 1981); Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776, 784 (Wyo.
1981); Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253, 1263 (Wyo. 1976).
110. James S. Jackson Co. v. Meyer, 677 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1984); Bacon v. Carey
Co., 669 P.2d 533, 536 (Wyo. 1983).
111. A sample notice of appeal is set out in Appendix IV.
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are few and simple: "The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking
the appeal; shall designate the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken." Few
published cases even mention this rule. Board of County Commissioners
v. Ridenour dealt with a premature notice of appeal which the court noted
complied with rule 2.02.' In In Re Estate of Campbell the court held
that the executrix, named as the party appealing in the notice of appeal,
was the proper party to prosecute the appeal.13 Hopkinson v. State noted
in passing that the notice of appeal complied with rule 2.02. "1 The dearth
of comment about rule 2.02 is surprising, because the notices of appeal
to the supreme court abound with failure to follow these simple mandates.
The failure to meet any one of the three basic requirements of rule
2.02 has not yet been deemed a jurisdictional defect. Nonetheless rule 1.02
authorizes dismissal. Furthermore, a notice of appeal which does not comply with rule 2.02 is subject to challenge on grounds that it is not a valid
notice of appeal.
Parties
The requirement that the parties appealing be designated is fairly
straightforward and one with which appellants generally comply. It is
helpful, but not necessary, to indicate the trial court status of the parties
appealing: plaintiff, defendant, third party defendant, and the like.
Rule 2.05 of the W.R.A.P. provides that the party taking the appeal
is the appellant. His opponent is the appellee. Proper use of these terms
is sometimes difficult to decipher, as in a recent case filed in the supreme
court. The only party who lost below and who did not appeal the district
court's ruling, but who had the most to gain by a supreme court reversal
was referred to as the appellee."'
Order
The order appealed from must be designated with sufficient certainty to identify it.116 It should also be correctly designated. In Rutledge v.
Vonfeldt,"7 the notice of appeal stated that the appeal was taken from
the denial of a motion for a new trial instead of from the judgment. The
supreme court found itself to be without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the wrong order was specified and dismissed the appeal.""8
In Jackson v. State," 9 the notice of appeal specified an order entered on
112. 623 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Wyo. 1981).
113. 673 P.2d 645, 648 (Wyo. 1983).
114. 664 P.2d 43, 53 (Wyo. 1983).
115. Brief of Third Party Defendants at 1, 3, Condos v. Trapp, No. 84-62 (Wyo. appeal
pending March 11, 1985).
116. Shaw v. Lewmont Drilling Assocs., 694 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1985) (opinion does not mention that it was difficult to tell from what the appeal was taken because the date spaces
were left blank and so forth).
117. 564 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1977).
118. Id at 351.
119. 547 P.2d 1203 (Wyo. 1976).
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December 13, which was not in fact entered until December 23.12" The court
dismissed that appeal as well because the order was not properly
designated. In In Re Estate of Campbell,"' however, a premature notice

of appeal, which named the correct order (one made final and appealable
by the subsequent decree of distribution) was held effective to take the
appeal to the supreme court. 2
Ordinarily a notation of the caption (including the trial court case
number), date, and court will suffice to designate the order. The judge
may also be designated. This lends specificity in multiple-judge districts.
Specifying the date the order was signed, combined with the above, is
generally sufficient to identify the order. Better practice is to indicate the
date the order was entered or filed with the district court clerk. That is
the official "date" of the order. An added advantage in this practice is
that it helps everyone keep the dates straight-the time limit for a notice
of appeal runs from the date the order was entered, not the date it was
signed.
Court

Rule 2.02 also requires that the court to which the appeal is taken
be specified. An appeal from the district court to the supreme court should
say so. Again, the supreme court has, in the past, ignored a failure to so
specify.123 For example, the court was not concerned by a notice of appeal
in which the only reference to the supreme court was that papers would
be sent to "Rita White."' 24
The rationale for this requirement is better put in perspective when
it is remembered that the W.R.A.P. also apply to appeals from an inferior
court or an administrative agency to the district court. Under those circumstances, it is obviously necessary to specify in which district court
the appeal will be pursued. Nonetheless, the rule as written applies to appeals to the supreme court as well.
Recommended Options

One optional portion of the notice of appeal is the designation of
transcript. Rule 4.02 requires the appellant to designate the transcript
to be included in the record on appeal and to serve his opponent with that
designation within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 2' However,
120. Id. at 1204.
121. 673 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1983).
122. Id. at 648-49.
123. Cases in which the court has not mentioned a party's failure to specify the court
to which the appeal is taken are: Shaffer v. United States Service, No. 84-225 (Wyo. dismissed

for failure to file briefs Nov. 20, 1984); Barnes v. State, 670 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1983); Simmons

v. State, 687 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1984); Jackson Hole Builders v. Piros, 654 P.2d 120 (Wyo. 1982);
Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Chapple-Hawkes, Inc., 643 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1982); Meyer v.
Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982).
124. Buckles v. States, No. 84-27 (Wyo. dismissed for late notice of appeal Jan. 8, 1985).
Rita M. White is the clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
125. Wyo. R. App. P. 4.02. Rule 4.02 also provides: "(Alnd, unless the entire transcript

is to be included, a statement of the issues [appellant] intends to present on the appeal." Id
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because the certificate that the transcript has been ordered must be filed
contemporaneously with the notice of appeal, counsel will know what
transcript he is designating by the time he files the notice of appeal.
Therefore, there is no reason to delay the designation for ten days and
it might just as well appear on the notice of appeal lest it be forgotten.
There is an additional, optional item to be included in a notice of appeal, found in rule 2.01: "[A] certificate of compliance therewith [ordering
pertinent transcript] shall be filed in the case or endorsed upon the notice
of appeal."' 26 Thus, the certificate concerning the ordering of the transcript
need not be included in the notice of appeal, but because it is so simple
to do and must be filed concurrently with the notice of appeal in any event,
that practice is recommended. Failure to include the certificate in the
notice of appeal is not error, but it must be included somewhere in the
record on appeal.
Frequently counsel omits either the certificate or the designation or
both and files only the certificate, required by rule 4.02, that "all record
papers and relevant transcript which he has designated are included as
part of the record on appeal.' '1 27 Thus far, the court has not deemed this
practice fatal to the appeal. For example, the court denied a motion to
dismiss for failure to designate the transcript and certify arrangements
in Graham v. Walker. 28 In Graham, there had been an oral request for
a transcript, forgotten by a busy court reporter, and a supreme court order
extending the time for filing the record on appeal. The court said,
"Although this Court is troubled by such careless appellate practice, Appellees' motion to dismiss is denied since no prejudice resulted to appellees
as a result of appellants' failure to designate the transcript concurrently
with filing the notice of appeal under Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P.' '12 9 Justice
Rooney dissented, saying:
Appellants did not comply with our rule. An oral request for a
transcript may have been made, but there is no indication that
arrangement for payment was made, orally or otherwise. The
notice of appeal did not contain a certificate that the transcript
126. Wyo. R. APP. P. 2.01. The certificate was neither on the notice of appeal nor certified in the record in In re Zabaleta, 638 P.2d 648, 649 (Wyo. 1981) and the appeal was dismissed. The fact that the record on appeal was also late was probably dispositive in Zabaleta.
Rossi v. State, was dismissed because, inter alia, the "appellant failed to file concurrently
with his notice of appeal evidence of arrangement for the transcript of evidence and payment for the same." No. 84-257 (Wyo. dismissed Nov. 27, 1984). But see Butler v. McGee,
363 P.2d 791, 792-93 (Wyo. 1961) (the court excused the failure of appellant to certify that
the transcript had been ordered where appellee moved to dismiss on this ground, because
the transcript had been filed timely and the purpose of the rule concerning certification was
to provide evidence of due diligence in case the transcript was not filed timely); Shaw v. Lewmont Drilling Assocs., Inc., 694 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1985) (no designation of transcript and no
transcript in record).
127. Wyo. R. APP. P. 4.02.
128. No. 84-309 (Wyo. motion to dismiss denied Jan. 18, 1985).
129. IRL
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had been ordered or that payment therefor had been arranged. If
the rules are not to be followed, why have them. I would dismiss
the appeal.'
Filing
Timely Filing
After the notice of appeal has been drafted, the next step is to file
it properly. While rule 1.02 authorizes an appropriate sanction for other
rules violations, it requires dismissal for failure to file timely a notice of
appeal.13' The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional."'
The time limit of fifteen days to file a notice of appeal' 3 begins to run
when the judgment or order is entered, 34 not when the judge signs it, not
when the party receives notice of it.3 5 Therefore, rule 14.03 of the
W.R.A.P., allowing an additional three days to respond when service is
made upon a party by mail, does not extend the time for filing the initial
notice of appeal.'36 A possible exception arises under the Worker's Compensation Act, which provides that an award is final unless 1there
is an
37
appeal "within 10 days after notice is mailed or delivered.'
130. Id-

131. "The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional." Wyo. R. APP. P. 1.02.
132. In re Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 648 (Wyo. 1983); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d
1159, 1160 (Wyo. 1982); Sanderson v. State, 649 P.2d 677,679 (Wyo. 1982); Murry v. State,
631 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Berger, 600 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo. 1979); Big Horn County
Comm'rs v. Hinckley, 593 P.2d 573, 581 (Wyo. 1979); Department of Revenue and Taxation
v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1301 (Wyo. 1979); Johnson v. Hauffe, 567 P.2d 735, 736 (Wyo. 1977);
Carr v. Hopkin, 556 P.2d 221, 223 (Wyo. 1976); Compton v. State, 555 P.2d 232, 234 (Wyo.
1976); Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wyo. 1976); Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538
P.2d 24, 38 (Wyo. 1975); Bowman v. Worland School Dist., 531 P.2d 889, 891 (Wyo. 1975);
Regan v. City of Casper, 494 P.2d 933, 935 (Wyo. 1972); Sun Land & Cattle Co. v. Brown,
387. P.2d 1004, 1006 (Wyo. 1964); King v. State, 376 P.2d 871, 871 (Wyo. 1962). Fourteen
appeals were dismissed in 1984 for failure to file timely a notice of appeal.
At the moment the soundness of this proposition, as it relates to criminal appeals, is
inquestion. The Wyoming Supreme Court recently announced its intention to follow Evitts
v. Lucey, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985), affirming Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 725 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984).
Murry v. State, No. 85-31 (Wyo. order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus and granting writ of certiorari March 7, 1985). In Blair v. Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming,
671 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1982), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held it was not a denial
of due process for the supreme court to dismiss an appeal on the grounds that the notice
of appeal was not timely filed. However, in Evitts v. Lucey, the United States Supreme Court
found that the failure of retained counsel to timely file a notice of appeal, resulting in dismissal
of defendant's one appeal as of right, violated the fourteenth amendment due process right
of effective assistance of counsel for federal habeas corpus purposes. In Murry v. State, the
defendant's appeal was dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 631 P.2d 26
(Wyo. 1981). Murry petitioned for a writ of certiorari or habeas corpus. The Wyoming Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the basis of Evitts v.Lucey. Justice Rooney dissented from that
order. He would distinguish the Wyoming rule which is jurisdictional from Kentucky's rule,
which is merely for the convenience of the court.
133. A simplified time chart is contained in Appendix III. For a more thorough timetable,
the reader is directed to Wyo. R. App. P. Appendix I.
134. Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01; Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Wyo. 1976).
135. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1301 (Wyo. 1979).
136. See Wyo. R. App. P. 14.03.
137. WYo. STAT. § 27-3-402(a), (b) (1977). Wyo. R. App. P. 27 indicates that the rules

of appellate procedure only supersede other rules which conflict with the appellate rules.
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Premature Notice of Appeal
Prior to the amendment of rule 2.01 of the W.R.A.P., a notice of appeal filed before entry of the order to be appealed was ineffective to bring
an appeal before the supreme court for review. 38 As of July 1, 1980, rule
2.01 includes the following provision: "A notice of appeal, in a civil or
criminal case, filed prematurely shall be treated as filed on the same day
as entry of judgment or final order, provided it complies with Rule 2.02,
W.R.A.P."'' A premature notice of appeal is deemed filed on the entry
of judgment. 40 For instance, a notice of appeal from a district court order
voiding bequests to subscribing witnesses, which was premature because
filed before the final decree of distribution, was treated as if it had been
filed on the date the distribution decree was entered.'
The implications of the premature notice of appeal rule are several.
The first is that it is no longer fatal to be eager and file the notice of appeal before the final order is entered. However, when this happens, counsel
should be aware that the time for the filing of the record on appeal then
would run from the date the judgment was entered. The second difficulty
which has arisen under the premature notice of appeal provision is that
counsel often file more than one notice of appeal. In other words, counsel
may file a notice of appeal immediately after oral judgment and sentence
is pronounced in a criminal case, but stating that the appeal is from the
judgment and sentence entered by the district court (thus complying with
rule 2.02). On the entry of the judgment, that notice of appeal then
becomes effective and is treated as if it were filed on the same day the
judgment and sentence was entered. Counsel often cannot leave well
enough alone, however, and after the entry of the judgment and sentence
files a second notice of appeal. It is unclear what the court might do if
the record on appeal were timely filed from the second notice of appeal,
but not from the date the first was deemed filed. For instance, if a notice
of appeal were filed prematurely on September 1, the judgment entered
on September 15, and a second notice of appeal filed on September 30,
a record of appeal, filed in the supreme court on October 31, would be timely filed from the September 30 notice of appeal, but not from September
15, the date the September 1 notice of appeal would be deemed filed. In
one such double notice of appeal case the record on appeal was fortunately timely filed from both notices of appeal.'
A word of caution: when the appeal is docketed in the supreme court
during the pendency of motions in the trial court which toll the notice
In light of In re Zabaleta, 638 P.2d 648 (Wyo. 1981), which held that the forty-day period
in the W.R.A.P. for filing the record on appeal superseded the seventy-day period in the
worker's compensation statutes (Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-615 (1977)), perhaps the rules would
be construed to supersede Wyo. STAT. § 27-3-402(a), (b)J1977).
138. Hayes v. Nielson, 658 P.2d 905, 906 (Wyo. 1977).
139. Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01.
140. In re Zabaleta, 638 P.2d 648, 649 (Wyo. 1981).
141. In re Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645, 649 (Wyo. 1983).
142. Kennedy v. State, No. 84-206 and No. 84-207 (Wyo. dismissed on other grounds
Oct. 2, 1984, reinstatement denied Nov. 1, 1984).
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of appeal period, the appeal will still be dismissed as premature. ' 4 The
motions specified in rule 2.01 toll the notice of appeal period because they
call into question the finality of the order already entered. Until the motions are decided, the matter is still pending before the trial court and
an appeal cannot be heard.
Time Extensions for Filing Notice of Appeal
Prior to the amendment of rule 2.01, the district court could extend
1
the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a finding of excusable neglect, "
but genuine emergency conditions, such as death, sickness, or undue delay
in the mails, were held necessary to support a finding of excusable
neglect.' The court found no excusable neglect where the appellant failed
to obtain the extension to which the appellee had agreed. ' Furthermore,
a notice of appeal had
under the old rule, any extension of time for filing
147
to be given before the original period expired.
The addition in 1980 to rule 2.01 of the phrase, "provided the application for extension of time is filed and the order entered prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment or final order appealed
from" 14 8 appears to ameliorate the harshness of the prior rule. In essence,
it gives a fifteen-day grace period. However, the trial court must sign and
enter an order to extend the time for filing and the notice of appeal must
be filed before the grace period expires. 149 Excusable neglect is still the
standard, and cases decided before the amendment still should serve adequately to illuminate that standard. Of course, ignorance of the provisions
of the appellate rules has never justified a finding of excusable neglect."50
The supreme court should be commended for allowing a grace period.
The prior rule, that the application for extension had to be made before
the notice of appeal time ran, was no help, even in emergencies. For it
is far easier, simpler and quicker to file a timely notice of appeal than to
apply for an extension. If an attorney knew the time was about to expire,
143. In 1984, three such appeals were dismissed. See Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01.
144. In re Estate of Graham, 597 P.2d 967, 968 (Wyo. 1979); Bosler v. Morad, 555 P.2d
567, 570 (Wyo. 1976).
145. Crossan v. Irrigation Dev. Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo. 1979); Bosler v. Morad,
555 P.2d 567, 570 (Wyo. 1976). See also Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252, 1255
(Wyo. 1976) ("such behavior as might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances").
146. Savage v. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 451 P.2d 796,
797-98 (Wyo. 1969).
147. In re Estate of Graham, 597 P.2d 967, 969 (Wyo. 1977). See also Elliott v. State,
626 P.2d 1044, 1049 n.8 (Wyo. 1981) (dealing with a late brief, but discussing extensions
in general).
148. Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01.
149. Denton v. Smith, No. 84-183 (Wyo. dismissed Aug. 13, 1984); Barlow v. State, No.
84-221 (Wyo. dismissed Oct. 18, 1984).
150. Crossan v. Irrigation Dev. Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo. 1979). See Denton v. Smith,
No. 84-183 (Wyo. dismissed Aug. 13, 1984) (attorney admitted to practice in Wyoming, but
actually practicing in Colorado, relied upon the 1975 supplement to the Wyoming Court Rules
volume, so he did not know that the notice of appeal deadline was fifteen days; in addition,
the motion for extension of the notice of appeal period was not granted within thirty days).
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he could just as well file the notice of appeal as seek an extension. The
grace period allows for what is probably the more common situation: the
attorney was unaware the period was about to, or already did, expire.
Service
Rule 2.01 of the W.R.A.P. requires the appellant to serve a copy of
his notice of appeal on other parties contemporaneously with the filing
of the notice of appeal. In DS v. Department of Public Assistance and
Social Services,"' the notice of appeal was timely filed, but the guardian
ad litem was not contemporaneously served with a copy. 152 Although contemporaneous service of a copy of the notice of appeal on a party is required by rule 2.01, the court said: "We hold that failure to timely serve
notice of appeal upon a necessary party is not a jurisdictional defect which
automatically requires dismissal and that the circumstances of this case
do not warrant dismissal of this appeal.",5 3 The court noted that the guardian ad litem would have to be served before the supreme court could obtain jurisdiction, "but it does not follow that the tardy observance of all
of these requirements will automatically result in dismissal of the
appeal." 154 Because there was no prejudice, because the delay was short,
and because the appellant demonstrated good faith, the court decided to
reach the merits of the case. "We do so with the admonition to all concerned that failure to serve notice of appeal upon all parties contemporaneously with the filing of the notice may, and probably will, in most
cases, result in dismissal of the appeal.""' Although the court in DS v.
Departmentof Public Assistance and Social Services indicated there may
be exceptions, it is also clear that dismissal is extremely likely.
There is no comfort in the language of FirstNational Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, where the court forgave failure to serve a notice of
appeal. The appellate rule in effect at that time required that copies of
the notice of appeal should be served "without unnecessary delay" rather
than contemporaneously with filing." The certificate of service indicating
that service has been made on all parties should, of course, be included
on the notice of appeal.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL

Contents
Once the notice of appeal has been filed properly, the appellant must
next see to the record on appeal to be filed in the supreme court. Rule
4 of the W.R.A.P. governs the contents of the record on appeal. Rule 4.01
requires that "[tihe original papers and exhibits filed in the district court,
the transcript of proceedings, if any, or any designated portion thereof,
151. 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980).
152. Id. at 914.
153. M
154. Id. at 915.
155. Id.

156. 559 P.2d 42, 50-51 (Wyo. 1977).
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and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk'1 of7 the
district court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 1
The court will not consider what is not in the record. 5 The absence
of potentially enlightening information may be construed adversely. A.
full and proper review can be insured by including all relevant materials
in the record on appeal-and that is guaranteed by filing them in the
district court.
Rule 4.02 of the W.R.A.P. governs transcripts. It allows ten days from
the filing of the notice of appeal to file and serve on the appellee a designation of transcript. Better practice is to include this right on the notice
of appeal, where possible." 9 Rule 4.02 also requires certification by the
reporter, the clerk of the district court, and appellant's counsel. The
reporter certifies the transcript; the clerk certifies the papers filed and
the transcript;6 0 and the appellant's counsel certifies all relevant papers
and that the transcript is what he has designated.'" Although the clerk
of district court transmits the record to the supreme court, the appellant
is responsible for compliance with rule 4.02.
2
The court must have the transcript before it in order to consider it.""
In City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., the minutes of the city council
had not been transcribed and thus the court could not consider them. In
Whirl Inn, however, the district court, in reviewing the city council's action, also held evidentiary hearings, which were transcribed. Thus, the
evidentiary review in the supreme court was sufficient. 2 The parties were
not so fortunate in Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, where the
supreme court was unable to review the propriety of the trial court's findings of fact because the court reporter had not certified the transcript
as required by rule 4.02 and thus the court could not consider the contents of the transcript. 164 In Stanton v. State, the tape recording of the
justice of the peace court proceedings had not been transcribed and thus
was not part of the record on appeal. However, because the state did not
deny that the prosecutor had made the statement in question, the supreme
court treated the statement as established. 1'6

157. Wyo. R. App. P. 4.01. Lawyers would be well-advised to give the clerk guidance

in the preparation and transmission of the record because the clerks are not ordinarily familiar
with appellate practice.
158. Judicial notice is, of course, an exception. Wyo. R. EvIv. 201(f) allows judicial notice
to be taken at any time.
159. See Appendix IV and text accompanying notes 125-29.
160. Wyo. R. App. P. 4.02. The certificate by the clerk of the district court is the last
paper in the record on appeal. Simpson v. Occidental Building and Loan Ass'n, 45 Wyo.
425, 430-31, 19 P.2d 958, 960 (1933).
161. A sample certificate appears in Appendix V.
162. Proceedings on a stipulated record, under Wyo. R. App. P. 4.03 are an exception
to the transcript requirement, but the court must have something before it on which to decide.
Sharp v. Sharp, 671 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1983); SC v. DN, 659 P.2d 568, 572 (Wyo. 1983).
Wyo. R. App. P. 4.04 also allows the record to be supplemented. Meuse-Rhine-ljssel Cattle
Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 1308 n.4 (Wyo. 1979).
163. 647 P.2d 1378, 1381 n.3 (Wyo. 1982).
164. 663 P.2d 518, 519-20 (Wyo. 1983).

165. 692 P.2d 947 (Wyo. 1984).
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Filing
Once the record has been compiled properly, it must be filed timely
in the supreme court. Rule 3.02 of the W.R.A.P. provides that the record
on appeal shall be filed within forty days from the time the notice of appeal is filed (or deemed filed).166 The appeal will be dismissed if the record
is not timely filed. 167 A caution is thus in order. When a premature notice
of appeal has been filed, the forty-day period likewise begins to run on
the day judgment was entered. Even when the notice of appeal is not
premature, the fifteen-day notice of appeal period and the forty-day record
on appeal requirements are distinct.
Before the W.R.A.P. were adopted, the application for an extension
of time in which to file the record on appeal had to be made before the
period expired."6 8 In addition, rule 3.02 once allowed either the district
court or the supreme court to extend the period for filing the record on
appeal. The district court could not extend the period beyond sixty days
from the first notice of appeal, or in other words, give more than a twentyday extension. Excusable neglect, or causes beyond control, was the standard. On the other hand, the supreme court could give an unlimited extension, but in only two situations: 1) if "without fault of the appealing
party" the transcript is not available and written evidence of proper arrangements for the transcript is1 produced;
and 2) a satisfactory showing
69
of "causes beyond his control."
Now only the supreme court can grant an extension. The two grounds
on which the court can grant an extension are basically the same, but yet
more stringent. When a party applies for an extension on the grounds
that the transcript is not available, in addition to the previous requirements, the application for extension must be "supported by an affidavit from the responsible reporter" which sets forth his pending cases
and the estimated completion dates, a justification for the extension in
the case in question, and a statement that the district court has been in166. See simplified time chart at Appendix III.
167. Williams v. Wyoming Bank & Trust Co., 591 P.2d 884, 885 (Wyo. 1979); Henning
v. City of Casper, 63 Wyo. 352, 362-63, 182 P.2d 840, 844 (1947); Sayre v. Roberts, 53 Wyo.
491, 494, 84 P.2d 718, 719 (1938); In re Federal Lands Emergency Construction Project No.
6,50 Wyo. 41, 42-43, 57 P.2d 684, 685 (1936); Samuel v. Christensen-Garig, Inc., 47 Wyo.
331, 332-33, 37 P.2d 680, 681 (1934); Porter v. Carstensen, 44 Wyo. 49, 50-51, 8 P.2d 446,
447 (1932).
The first reported opinion on appellate practice in the fledgling territory involved dismissal
of appeals for failure to file timely the record on appeal:
the appellees respectively filed their motions to dismiss the appeal, on the
ground, especially, that such appeal had not been perfected by duly filing a
transcript in the Supreme Court of the proceedings in the court below. The
motion was in each case granted, the court holding that it was then too late
to bring up the records of the district court.
Lannier v. Haase, 1 Wyo. 25 (1870).
168. Butler v. McGee, 363 P.2d 791, 793 (Wyo. 1961); Martens v. State Highway Comm'n,
354 P.2d 222, 223 (Wyo. 1960). See also Douglas Reservoir Water Users. Ass'n v. Garst,
451 P.2d 451, 453 (Wyo. 1969) (dismissed for failure to timely complete record or to move
for an extension or permission to file the absent part out of time).
169. Wyo. R. App. P. 3.02 (1977).
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formed of the requested extension. 70 As to an application for extension
due to causes beyond control, a "satisfactory showing" that "diligence
was used by counsel" is also required.' 71 The court has not explained what
difference due diligence would make if the causes necessitating an extension were truly beyond control.
The requirements for an extension of time in which to file the record
on appeal have been made more stringent by amendment of the rule. Of
course, without an extension
of time, the late filing of a record on appeal
172
will result in dismissal.
Supreme Court Jurisdiction
Rule 3.01 governs the court's appellate jurisdiction.' 7 The supreme
court assumes jurisdiction of an appeal when the record on appeal is
filed.7 4 The failure to observe the supreme court's jurisdiction once the
record on appeal has been filed raises problems. Until the supreme court
releases its jurisdiction, typically when the mandate to the district court
has issued and the record has been sent back to the district court,' the
district court is without jurisdiction to act further in the matter. Hayes
v. State176 involved a district court order made before the mandate in Mr.
Hayes' appeal had issued.'77 The supreme court said that because the mandate had not yet been issued, the appeal was still pending. 17 Once the
appeal was docketed, the case was under the jurisdiction of the supreme
court, and the order made by the district court was made without jurisdiction. Therefore, the supreme court vacated the district court order. 1 9 In
Gresham v. State, the supreme court granted a motion to hold the appeal
in abeyance so that the trial court could hear a new trial motion." This
is better practice.
The problems raised by failure to observe the supreme court's jurisdiction can be rather perplexing. For example, an appeal reached the court
in 1984 which was dismissed on the court's own motion because the appeal was not from a final order as required by rule 1.05 of the W.R.A.P. 8 '
170. Id 3.02 (Supp. 1984).
171. Id
172. Jessen v. State, 622 P.2d 1374, 1377 n.3 (Wyo. 1971). See also Williams v. Wyoming Bank and Trust Co., 591 P.2d 884, 885 (Wyo. 1979). In 1984, one appeal was dismissed
for late filing of the record on appeal or related matters.
173. Wyo. R. App. P. 3.01 states: "Except as otherwise provided in Rules 4.05 lauthorizing
the clerk of district court to retain the record for the convenience of attorneys under limited
circumstances] and 4.06 [authorizing a hearing by the supreme court before the record is
transmitted], W.R.A.P., the Supreme Court shall not acquire jurisdiction over the cause until the record on appeal is filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court."
174. Jessen v. State, 622 P.2d 1374, 1377 n.3 (Wyo. 1981); DS v. Department of Public
Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 915 (Wyo. 1980).
175. See Wyo. R. App. P. 4.07.
176. 599 P.2d 569, 570 (Wyo. 1979).
177. Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 588 (Wyo. 1979).
178. 599 P.2d at 570.
179. Id. at 570.
180. Gresham v. State, No. 84-305 (Wyo. order of Jan. 7, 1985).
181. Noonan v. Texaco, No. 84-243 (Wyo. dismissed Oct. 31, 1984).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

25

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 20 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XX

The difficulty was that the order did not determine the rights and liabilities
of all the parties as required by rule 54(b) of the W.R.C.P. The record on
appeal was filed in the supreme court on October 3, 1984. In the meantime, on October 19, the trial court entered another order, which finally
did dispose of all the parties. This was, of course, unknown to the supreme
court which, on October 31, 1984, entered its order dismissing the appeal
for lack of a final order.182 On November 5, 1984, the appellant filed in
the supreme court a motion to reinstate the appeal, arguing that now there
was a final order. '8
The question arose whether the October 19 order of the trial judge,
entered while jurisdiction was in the supreme court, not in the trial court,
was anything more than a nullity. In the end, the court apparently decided that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the two defendants who
were expressly left in the suit by the previous trial court order, and thus
could dismiss the complaint against them without running afoul of the
supreme court's jurisdiction. Such an order would then make the original
trial court order final as of October 19, the day the second order was
entered. Then, applying the premature notice of appeal principles, the
previous notice of appeal would date from the October 19 trial court
8 4 The court did not reinstate the appeal, but considered the original
order.1
notice of appeal effective to appeal from the October 19 order. It extended the time for filing the record on appeal to accommodate the fact that
the new period in which to file the record on appeal (from an October 19
notice of appeal) had expired while the motion for reinstatement was
pending.
The record on appeal is an important and necessary element of an appeal. If a proper trial court record has been built, the record on appeal
is not difficult to compile. The docketing of the record sets the briefing
schedule in motion and delineates the supreme court's jurisdiction.
APPELLATE BRIEFS

After the record on appeal has been docketed in the supreme court,
the attorney must turn his attention to writing, filing, and serving his
brief.
Contents

Rule 5.01 of the W.R.A.P. governs the contents of briefs.' 5 Its simple requirements apply to appellants' briefs, appellees' briefs, 88 and briefs
in proceedings upon certification of questions of law by federal courts,187
182. Id
183. Which, incidentally, failed to comply with the Wyo. R. App. P. 15 requirement that
motions for reinstatement be accompanied by a brief.
184. Noonan v. Texaco, No. 84-243 (Wyo. order denying petition for reinstatement of
appeal and extending time to file record on appeal and docket appeal Nov. 30, 1984).
185. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.01.
186. Id at 5.02.
187. Id at 11.06.
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and presumably, to reply briefs, 188 amicus curae briefs, 189 and briefs in support of applications for rehearing, 190 motions to dismiss,'" and petitions
to reinstate.'92
Rule 5.01 requires the sections to be included in the briefs to be put
"under appropriate headings." In turn, the necessary sections are: a table
of contents (with page references); a table of cases (alphabetic, with page
references); a table of statutes and other authorities (with page references);
a statement of the issues; a statement of the case (nature of the case, course
of proceedings, disposition below); an argument (optional summary; contentions, reasons, authorities relied on; parts of the record relied upon);
and a short conclusion
(relief sought). Counsel submitting the brief must
93
also sign the brief.
The stated purpose of rule 5.01 is to help focus the facts, issues and
authorities. 194But it is also clear that a proper focus eases the court's task
of deciding the case before it. Because the court has promulgated all appellate rules, there can be little doubt that rule 5.01 is a statement from
the court of what it considers most helpful in a brief. Thus, compliance
with the rule is not only proper but is also wise. 19' Indeed, the court has
on numerous occasions expressed its displeasure with failure to comply
with the mandate of rule 5.01. The court has said that where there is no
table of cases, or subject index, and where the names of counsel and the
persons represented did not appear, there is no compliance with the rule. 99
The court has also announced that it considers the mere absence of a list
of issues to be a clear violation of rule 5.01 and may refuse to consider
the contentions of the party erring.9 7 The court has also criticized briefs
where the arguments do not correspond one to one with the issues.' 9 The
court's most recent pronouncement is "a firm admonition that we will not
188. See id. at 5.03.
189. See id at 5.12.
190. See ic.at 8.01.

191. See icL at 16. Rule 16 states that "[a] motion directed to a subject matter which
may substantially affect the disposition of a case" is to be supported "by a memorandum
of points and authorities." Thus purely formal motions need not be accompanied by briefs.
The non-moving party under a rule 16 motion has ten days to respond.
192. See id. at 15. Rule 15 requires that the petition "shall be accompanied" by a brief.
The petition for reinstatement and briefs in support must be filed within ten days of the
order of dismissal; opposing counsel has ten days to respond.
193. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.01.

194. Strang Telecasting, Inc. v. Ernst, 610 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 1980).
195. Only a fool would fly in the face of such a clear indication of what makes the court
happy! and it takes a fool to know a fool. See Brief for Appellant, Fife v. State, 676 P.2d
565 (Wyo. 1984); Brief for Appellants, Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (Wyo. 1984).
196. See Crozier v. Malone, 366 P.2d 125, 126 (Wyo. 1961) (both parties failed to comply
with the Wyoming Supreme Court Rules, Rules 12(a) and (c), but the court said that the
failure caused no serious inconvenience and that it was merely observing the failure to comply).
197. See Cline v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 614 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Wyo. 1980) (this made it extremely difficult to determine the issues and the court noted "it is not our job to draw a
list of issues to frame appellant's argument.").
198. I& at 1337. See also Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 10 (Wyo. 1980) (nine issues,
five arguments).
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always tolerate such glaring failures to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure." 91
Rule 5.01 requires that the arguments be supported by authority and
reference to the record. At one time the failure to clearly frame the issues
and cite proper authority was viewed leniently by the court. "Judging
from some of the statements made in the brief of respondent and some
of the cases cited, it is probably the theory of counsel for plaintiff and
respondent that the latter had a right to rescind the contract, and
therefore, sue for breach thereof." 00 This is no longer the case. The court
will refuse to consider contentions not supported by cogent argument or
pertinent authority. 201 Furthermore, the court will not consider an alleged
error supported only with perfunctory argument." 2
The assignment of error must be specific enough to inform the supreme
court what error was committed. 03 The appellant must also direct the
court's attention to the pertinent parts of the record.1 4 Failure to do so
may result in the court's refusing to consider the questions raised. 0 5 Not
only are references to the record required, but "... . an imprecise factual
discussion will not profit the advocate's client in this court. We see no
reason to tolerate a practice which can only succeed if this court is
misled. ' '
The supreme court did tolerate the practice in Strang
Telecasting, Inc. v. Ernst, because the appeal involved the review of an
order granting summary judgment. The court warned, however, that in
199. 37 Gambling Devices v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 712 (Wyo. 1985).

200. Hawkins v. Stoffers, 40 Wyo. 227, 240, 276 P. 452, 457 (1929).

201. Zanetti v. Zanetti, 689 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wyo. 1984); Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d
1121, 1124 (Wyo. 1984); Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Wyo. 1984);
Holding's Little America v. Board of County Comm'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699,
703 (Wyo. 1983); Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Wyo. 1983); Young v. Hawks,
624 P.2d 235,238 n.2 (Wyo. 1981); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1363 (Wyo. 1981); State
v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Wyo. 1980); Cline v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 614 P.2d 1335, 1337
(Wyo. 1980); Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 (Wyo. 1980); Dechert v. Christopulos, 604
P.2d 1039, 1045, (Wyo. 1980); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, 603 P.2d 862 (Wyo. 1979); Grable
v. State, 601 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Wyo. 1979); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo.
1979). Peterson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lander, 579 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Wyo. 1978). See Cubin
v. Cubin, 685 P.2d 680,682 (Wyo. 1984) ("In accordance with our usual rule we will not discuss
the issue

. .".

The court will refuse to consider an argument with no citation of authority. Salmeri v.
Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1252 (Wyo. 1976); Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P.2d 1360, 1365
(Wyo. 1975); In re Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d 793, 798 (Wyo. 1972). But see Sanville v. State,
593 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (Wyo. 1979) (appellant cited no authority for his propositions, but
the court decided the merits anyway).
202. Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1984); Stephenson v. Mitchell ex
rel. Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 569 P.2d 95, 97 (Wyo. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Thermopolis
v. Bonham, 559 P.2d 42, 51 (Wyo. 1977).
203. Booth v. Hackney, 516 P.2d 180, 185 (Wyo. 1973).
204. State Surety Co. v. Lamb Constr. Co., 625 P.2d 184, 191 (Wyo. 1981). See also Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 1979) (appellant's burden to present the court
a complete record on which to base a decision).
205. See Simpson v. Occidental Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 45 Wyo. 425, 429-30, 19 P.2d
958, 959 (1933). But see Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Co., 73 Wyo. 287, 318-20, 278 P.2d
605, 617 41955).
206. Strang Telecasting, Inc. v. Ernst, 610 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo. 1980).
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the future it would feel free to exercise its rule 1.02 discretion less leniently,
even in summary judgment cases. 0°
Submission of a trial brief, or reference to a trial brief in the record,
does not meet the briefing requirement. The court gave a clear warning
in 1975 that it considered this practice to be a failure to comply with the
rules.""' And in 1977, the court said:
In passing, we want to say we very nearly dismissed this appeal
for failure of the appellant to comply with Rule 12 of this court.
Since we have been lax in the past in enforcing its provisions, we
permitted this appeal to proceed. The appellant filed no acceptable
brief in this court. The "brief" merely referred to briefs filed with
the district court and appearing in the record but did not attach
copies. The rule requires the filing of six [now seven] copies of
briefs; there is only one record. Each member of the court must
have a copy. Additionally, we expect to recieve briefs prepared
for the use of this court, not those prepared for the district court.
The requirements very often vary in this court. This is the last
case in which that practice will be tolerated. In all future cases,
the appeal will be summarily dismissed if the appellant's brief,
such as the one received from the appellant here, is filed. 00
Despite the court's disapproval, the practice of relying on a trial brief
continues."'
The briefing requirements are simple enough. They are all spelled out
in rule 5.01. At the least, the party who does not comply may have his
contentions ignored. At the most, the entire appeal may be dismissed.
Rule 5.05 of the W.R.A.P. requires that briefs must not be typed in
elite, or twelve-pitch type. Only pica, or ten-pitch type is permitted.' Furthermore, the briefs are to 2be12 submitted on eight and one half by eleven
inch paper, not legal sized.
Filing
The properly composed brief must next be filed. Rule 5.06 of the
W.R.A.P. governs the filing of briefs. The requirements are simple. The
parties must file seven copies of their briefs in the supreme
court and serve
21 3
one copy on the opposing party or his attorney.
207. Id.
208. Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1975).
209. Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 569 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Wyo.
1977).
210. See Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979); International Ass'n of
Fire Fighters v. Civil Service Comm'n, No. 84-244 (Wyo. appeal pending March 11, 1985).
211. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.05 and Wyo. R. App. Appendix II.
212. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.05. See Skurdal v. State, No. 84-123 (Wyo. appeal pending March
11, 1985); Shaw v. Lewmont Drilling, 694 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1985) (briefs of appellants submitted on legal-size paper).
213. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.01.
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The time for filing appellant's brief begins to run from the day the
record on appeal is docketed in the supreme court. Appellant has thirty
days to file his brief.2" ' Appellee has thirty days from the filing of appellant's brief, if appellee is personally served.
The mailing rule applies to briefs. Rule 14.03 provides that when the
party served has a certain time in which to respond and service upon him
is made by mail, the period allotted for response is extended automatically by three days.215 The mailing rule thus extends only the time for filing
a response, not an original document. If the first paper is due on a certain
day, it is due to be filed in court on that day, not to be placed in the mail.
Under no circumstances does the mailing rule extend the time in which
the person who is originally to file or serve must file or serve. It applies
only to his opponent. Thus the mailing rule extends the briefing periods
allotted for the appellee and appellant's reply brief. Therefore, appellee
has thirty-three days from the filing of appellant's brief if appellee is served
by mail. 16 Then, from the filing of appellee's brief, appellant has ten days
in which to reply to new issues (or thirteen if served by mail).1 7 The basic
briefing period is shorter in two kinds of cases: in death penalty cases,
in which it is twenty-five days; and in worker's compensation cases, in
which it is fifteen days.218 The ten-day reply period applies to both.
Failure to file timely a brief of appellant results in dismissal of the
appeal, 19 as does complete failure to file a brief.2 0 Failure of appellee to
file timely a brief should not result in dismissal, or else every victor at
the trial court level could preserve his victory by failing to file a brief timely. Just what action is appropriate or likely in such a case is unclear, but
rule 1.02 authorizes several sanctions. Where the appellee completely fails
' 22
to file a brief, rule 5.11 provides that the appellee "shall not be heard. '
A request for an extension of the briefing period should be made before
the brief is due. Rule 5.10 of the W.R.A.P. requires as much. This was
not always in the rule. The court had authority to grant an extension in
extreme cases even after the time for filing was past.2 After the effective date of rule 5.10, there can be no extension of time to file briefs after
214. Id. at 5.06.
215. Id. at 14.03.
216. Id. at 5.06, 14.03.
217. Id. at 5.06.
218. Id; Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-615 (1977).
219. Elliott v. State, 626 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Wyo. 1981) (supreme court review of district
court's dismissal of appeal from county court because brief was filed beyond the time allowed in second extension). Grippen v. State, 20 Wyo. 486, 488-89, 124 P. 764 (1928); Nelson
v. Sunset Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 245, 247, 254 P. 127, 127 (1927; "W" Sheep Co. v. Pine Dome
Oil Co., 29 Wyo. 59, 59, 210 P. 389, 390 (1922). In 1984, thirteen appeals were dismissed
for failure timely to file briefs. Note that this result is not mandated by the rules. Rather,
"as a matter of practice," the court will dismiss. Elliott v. State, 626 P.2d at 1049.
220. Wyo. R. App. P. 5.11; Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 516 (Wyo. 1983); Carr v. Hopkin,
556 P.2d 221, 223 (Wyo. 1976).
221. Wvo. R. App. P. 5.11.
222. Savage v. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel Workmen's Comp. Dep't, 451 P.2d 796,
797 (Wyo. 1969); Spence v. Nicks Motor Co., 68 Wyo. 443, 445, 235 P.2d 346, 347 (1951).
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the period has elapsed.2 3 This is based on the notion that there can be
no extension of that which has already terminated.2 4 It has been suggested
that excusable neglect, such as failure in the mail service, may be shown
to obtain an untimely extension,2 2 5 although the court has noted that it
will frown on a late extension request in appellate matters. 22 6 However,
a notable 1984 case involved an appeal which was dismissed for failure
to file timely a brief. The appellant petitioned for reinstatement claiming
excusable neglect: the attorney had written "brief due" on the wrong
Thursday on his calendar. He also claimed that no prejudice resulted since
although he had received only a fifteen-day extension, both the supreme
court and the appellee would have given him a thirty-day extension, and
filed within the thirty-day period. The court reinstated
the brief was
2 7in fact
the appeal!
Service
Rule 5.06 of the W.R.A.P. governs service of a brief on an opponent.
The rule specifically requires that one copy be served upon or mailed to
the opposite party.2 Since the amendment of rule 5.06 on July 1, 1980,
service upon the other party is to be made concurrently with filing in the
supreme court. The old rule allowed the appellant to serve his opponent
within the thirty-day period. Because the appellee's time to brief his case
begins to run when the appellant's brief is filed in the supreme court, the
potential for cheating the appellee was clear. The appellant could file his
brief five days after the record on appeal was filed, but not serve his appellee until twenty-five days later-leaving the appellee with only five days
to respond, rather than the thirty allotted. The amendment forecloses such
opportunity for foul play and gives the appellee his full measure of time.
Rule 5.07 requires the appellant to serve a copy of his brief on the
Attorney General if the state is a party, if the state's property is involved,
or if a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional. This rule applies to reserved
29
Of
questions in criminal cases and bills of exception as well as appeals.
particular concern, because it is so easy to forget, is the requirement of
service on the Attorney General when "a statute, ordinance or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional." '2 30 Failure to serve the Attorney General
in these cases is grounds for dismissal.2 3 1 Of course, the appellant who
223. Wood v.City of Casper, 660 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Wyo. 1983); EUiott v. State, 626 P.2d
1044, 1049 (Wyo. 1981).
224. Elliott v. State, 626 P.2d at 1049; Martens v. State Highway Comm'n, 354 P.2d
222, 223 (Wyo. 1960).
225. Elliott v. State, 626 P.2d at 1049.
226. Id at 1049 n.8. In 1984, one appeal was dismissed for failure to obtain a timely
extension.
227. Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., No. 84-153 (Wyo. reinstated
Dec. 19, 1984). When asked how this result could be justified, one member of the court responded, "Well, this is the time of year when miracles DO happen!"
228.
229.
230.
231.

Wyo. R. App. P. 5.06.
Id at 5.07.
Id
Ririe v. Board of Trustees, 674 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1983).
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fails to serve the brief on his opponent also is subject to having his appeal dismissed according the sanctions authorized rule 1.02.21S
CONCLUSION

The rules which guide an attorney in perfecting an appeal are basic
and easy to follow. When they are observed, the appeal will be perfected
and the merits of the controlversy will be reached and decided by the
supreme court. The best way to insure a decision on the merits, the goal
sought by the parties to an appeal, is to follow the rules.
While it is true that an appeal might be dismissed for violation of any
of the rules, it should be remembered that the bulk of the appeals to the
Wyoming Supreme Court are perfected and decided. The caution urged
here is that, perhaps in the future the court will take a less kindly attitude
toward failure to follow the appellate rules. Indeed, in the past few years,
there have been several amendments which make it more difficult to obtain an exception to a rule or an extension of time. The court has also
demonstrated an increasingly harsh stand against rules violations,
deciding that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for a violation formerly
tolerated, giving stronger warnings, and invoking penalties more often.
The court has not always been consistent in its application of sanctions,
but dismissal is clearly among those authorized.
The mandate of the rules of appellate procedure is simple and easy
to follow. There is little excuse for failure to comply with any of the rules,
and even less for failure to comply with those rules which have been
discussed and explained repeatedly in published opinions and orders. The
cost of failure to comply may be high. Dismissal of an appeal for failure
to follow the rules may well be grounds for a malpractice claim. Furthermore, a client whose appeal has been dismissed might feel disinclined to
pay the attorney. Other authorized sanctions, short of dismissal, can be
nearly as distasteful. In any event, even if a sanction is not imposed, the
client gains no advantage from failure to comply with the rules.
The best practice is to become familiar with the appellate rules, watch
for amendments and reported opinions and orders, and follow the rules
scrupulously.

232. Carr v. Hopkin, 556 P.2d 221, 223 (Wyo. 1976) (decided under Wyo. S. CT. R. 120)).
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APPENDIX I
WYOMING SUPREME COURT
TOTALS
1969-1984
Year

Appeals
Original Total
Civil Criminalf Total Casest? Cases

1969

86

1970

127

1971

114

1972

109

1973

150

1974

164

1975

8

129

1976

82

46

10

138

1977

96

39

11

116

1978

107

42

8

157
177

1979
1980

135

48

24

207

1981

140

46

12

198

1982

150

48

28

226
276

1983
1984

Cases
Cases
Disposed Dismissed

9

331

Tincluding bills of exceptions.
ttthese are cases in which the supreme court's original jurisdiction is
invoked.
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APPENDIX II
SUMMARY OF 1984 DISMISSALS
REASON FOR DISMISSAL

COURT'S APPELLEE'S
OWN MOTION MOTION
BOTH TOTAL

Late notice of appeal

11
1

Defective notice of appeal
No filing fee
Late record on appeal
Late motion to extend time for filing
appellant's brief
Late appellant's brief
No final order
54 claims
parties

2

premature notice of appeal
new trial motion tolls
trial court granted motion
to reconsider

6
6
3
2

denial of:
summary judgment
permissive intervention
writ of habeas corpus
writ of prohibition
free transcript
motion to dismiss
granting of:
new trial motion
partial summary judgment
approving receivers report,
but not closing estate
TOTAL no final order
Trial court had no jurisdiction

1

1

24

2

4

Moot
No standing

4
3

3
1

Voluntary dismissal by appellant
or stipulation and settlement
or by joint motion
TOTAL
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss2/9
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17
5
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APPENDIX III

NUMBER OF DAYS*
Workers
Compensation

Death
Penalty

0

0

0

Notice of Appeal
(filed in District Court)

15

15

15

Record on Appeal
(filed in Supreme Court)

40

40

40

Appellant's Brief
(filed in Supreme Court)

15

25

30

15

25

30

10

10

10

Entry of Judgment or
Final Order (in District Court)

Appellee's Brief
(filed in Supreme Court)
Reply Brief
(filed in Supreme Court)

All
Other Cases

*Entry of judgment or final order is day zero. The time periods indicated are the maximum allowed for the event listed at left. The time
period listed begins to run with the preceding event listed at left,
regardless of when it actually occurs.
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APPENDIX IV
STATE OF WYOMING
COUNTY OF

)
__

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT

CRIMINAL/CIVIL ACTION NO.
Plaintiff,
V.

Defendant
NOTICE OF APPEAL
in
, the
Notice is hereby given that
of
State
the
of
Court
Supreme
the
the above entitled action appeals to
entitled
order/judgment
final
the
from
Wyoming,
entered on
DESIGNATION OF TRANSCRIPT
hereby designates the following
Appellant
on appeal:
record
the
in
included
be
to
transcript
CERTIFICATION CONCERNING TRANSCRIPT
The undersigned certifies that he has made satisfactory arrangements
for the preparation of and payment for a transcript of the proceedings
designated above.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, attorney for appellant, hereby certify
I,
that the foregoing Notice of Appeal and Designation of Transcript was
served by placing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States
addressed
day of___
mail, postage prepaid, this
.. on:)
.
..
.
of
day
this
personally
(or
as follows:
___

name and address of appellee
and or appellee's attorney

Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX V
[CAPTION]
CERTIFICATE OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL
appellant,
, attorney of record for
I,
do hereby certify that the foregoing is all of the record papers and relevant transcript that I have designated to be included in the record on
appeal and that the foregoing is the original of all those documents
designated, unless otherwise specified.
day of
Dated this
_,

Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX VI
CHECKLIST FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL*
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Does the notice of appeal comply with W.R.A.P. 2.01, 2.02, 4.02?
Specify party appealing?
Designate transcript and/or list issues?
Designate judgment or order being appealed?
Certify transcript has been ordered?
Name court to which appeal is taken?
Was the time for appeal extended in accord with W.R.A.P. 2.01?
Includes:
W.R.C.P. 59: motions for new trial, to alter or amend
W.R.C.P. 50 (b): motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict
W.R.C.P. 52 (b): motion to amend or make additional findings of
fact
W.R.Cr.P. 30 (c): motion for judgment of acquittal
W.R.Cr.P. 34: motion for new trial
W.R.Cr.P. 35: motion in arrest of judgment
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
Notice of Appeal due: (15 days from entry of judgment)
Notice of Appeal filed:
Was it timely?
Any other problems?
Premature notice
Amendments to notice
Do these problems undermine jurisdiction?
FINAL ORDER
Is the judgment or order recited in the notice of appeal substantially
appealable? (i.e., is it a final order in writing signed by a judge?)
Is W.R.C.P. 54 {b) involved? (i.e., were there multiple parties or
multiple claims?) If so, have all of the requisite determinations been
made?
RECORD ON APPEAL
Record on Appeal Due: (40 days from filing of notice of appeal, unless
extended)
Record on appeal filed in Supreme Court:
Was it timely filed?
MISCELLANEOUS
Is the appeal a review of an administrative action? Any problems?
(See W.R.A.P. Rule 12)
Does the appeal arise from a county or municipal court? Any
problems? (See W.R.A.P.C.L.J.)
*The bulk of appeals meeting these requirements will not be dismissed.
The checklist does not, however, make provision for every esoteric
problem.
_
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